Is Martyrdom a Gift or a Charism?

There's a story told by Corrie Ten Boom, the great Protestant confessor for the Christian faith who safely harboured Jews during the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands.  She related how, with the terrible prospect of Hitler's machine, she admitted to her father, "Daddy, I am afraid that I will never be strong enough to be a martyr for Jesus Christ."  Here's how the converstion unfolded:

Mr Ten Boom:  "Tell me, when you take a train trip from Haarlem to Amsterdam, when do I give you the money for the ticket? Three weeks before?” 

Corrie:  "No, Daddy, you give me the money for the ticket just before we get on the train."

Mr Ten Boom:  "That is right, and so it is with God’s strength. Our wise Father in heaven knows when you are going to need things too. Today you do not need the strength to be a martyr. But as soon as you are called upon for the honor of facing death for Jesus, He will supply the strength you need—just in time."

Corrie's father indicates that the gift of strength needed for martyrdom would be ad hoc, which certainly fits the definition of a charism--those gifts from God, unlike the Septenary--which are not habitual but given for the moment.  St Paul, in listing the various charismatic gifts, indicates that martyrdom as a charism only by way of implication.  After listing the various charisms in 1 Corinthians 12:4-11, he gives a parital summary of them in the next chapter, with the addition "...and if I deliver my body to be urned, but have not love, I am nothing" (1 Cor 13:3; St Thomas indeed indicates that martyrdom is spoken of here--cf Super I Corinthos C.13, L.1, #769).  One may argue (cogently, I think) that martyrdom may even be a species of '"prophecy," which St Paul indicates is the greatest of the charismatic gifts in 1 Corinthians 14:2, 4.  We are probably on more stable ground to say that martyrdom falls under the charism of faith indicated in 1 Corinthians 12:9, which differs from faith as a theological virtue.

In the language of theology, "charisms" or "chrismatic gifts" or, ambiguously, the "spiritual gifts" are given the technical name of gratia gratis data--'gift freely given' (cf 1a 2ae, q. 111, art. 4)  This differs from gratia gratum faciens--'gift making pleasing,' which, in catechetical language, is what we mean by saying "sanctifying grace."

Yet, in his Summa theologiae, 2a 2ae, q. 124, St Thomas Aquinas discusses martyrdom within the broader treatment of his treatise on the virtue of fortitude, which appeared in the very previous question.  This gives the impression that martyrdom for the faith (2a 2ae, q. 124, art. 5, sed contra; resp.) falls under a merely cardinal virtue.  The relationship of martyrdom to fortitude becomes even more puzzling when it is "about" fearlessness and daring but "against" fear (qq. 125-127) and the "potential parts" of the virtue of fortitude are given to be "confidence" (for which he substitutes "magnanimity"), "magnificence," "patience," "perseverance" (qq. 129, 134, 136, 137).  But still no "martyrdom."

What the heck, Thomas?

Here's my suspicion:  St Thomas somewhat 'isolates' martyrdom from the gift of Fortitude and from the potential part of the virtue of fortitude becuase it is not only a charismatic gift, but also a sacamental grace belonging to Confirmation:  "In this sacrament, as stated above the Holy Ghost is given to the baptized for strength [ad robur]" (S.th., 3a, q. 72, art. 7, resp., emphasis added).  Thomas' choice of robur here is not insignificant; it appears also in his Compendium theologiae, bk. IV, ch. 58, 3-4 and ch. 60, 1, in De articulus Fidei, part 2, and several times in Super Sententiis IV, dist. 7 all in reference to the sacrament of Confirmation.  More to the point, Thomas does relate Confirmation to martyrdom (cf S.th., 3a, q. 72, art. 8, ad 3).  We know, too, that Confirmation confers the fullness of the Septenary upon the neophyte--including the gift of Fortitude (art. 2, resp.).  The question, then, becomes:  What is the relationship between F/fortitudo and robur?

Lewis & Short indicates that robur means 'hardwood' or 'oak-wood,' from which we get the adjectival robustus and the English robust by way of Middle French's robuste.  Deferrari further points out that it is related to 'fortitude':  "of fortitude, law, courage, hope, the passions, authority, grace" (emphasis added).  It would seem, then, that the strength of robur effected by Confirmation may be the Septenary's Fortitudo at work (as an act?), which in turn perfects the virtue of fortitudo.  That is to say, the virtue of fortitude is perfected by the gift bearing the same name not only to overcome dangers, but to immovably stand like an oak tree in the face of violence against the Name of Jesus.

It is often said that the Summa theologiae reads like a Gothic cathedral, but I think this is more true than most people mean:  Like the motifs and artwork in these mother-churches in reference to each other and to the whole, culminating at the vaulting which direct our gaze heavenward, Thomas intends us to read his incomplete life's work 'from the ground up,' with each question, each article demanding the rubric "hold that thought...!" until the work is finished.  And it was, in the Angelic Doctor's own beatific vision, to which our reading of him also invites us to.  His incomplete remarks about martyrdom was intentional, looking towards, I would suggest, the robur of Confirmation which brought Fortitudo to fullness.  So the answer to our question--Is martyrdom a gift or a charism?--I'm inclined to say:  Both.

All the more, then, does the ceremonial blow on the cheek of the Confirmandi, kneeling immovably before the bishop, make sense.

Is Continence a Fruit or a Virtue?

When one reads St Thomas Aquinas, it quickly becomes apparent how the contemporary Church is occasionally removed from his thinking--the "Restorationist" party no less than the "Concilium."  Whether this is a good thing or not is beside the point; sometimes, (and I mean sometimes) "Thomism" falls victim to the game of Telephone in post-seventeenth century Manuals, particularly those prepared under Jesuit auspices (think of  Giovanni Battista Scaramelli and his divorcing of the virtues and gifts from moral theology in his Directorium Asceticum).

When the avergae pew-sitter thinks of the marital status of (most) Roman clergy, the phrase "clerical celibacy" comes to mind; ecclesiastical discipline prefers to speak of "clerical continence" since it is possible to be celibate/unmarried and unchaste (I'm looking at you, Theodore) and it is possible to be married yet continent (Catherine and Eddie Dougherty received a dispensation to do just this when they married).  'Celibacy' has to do with an intentionally unmarried state (it is not the same as being 'single'); 'chastity' as to do with the lawful use of the sexual faculty (which varies between married and unmarried people, and again between men and women); 'continence,' on the other hand, in the contemporary understanding is total absention from the use of sexual faculty physically (but not necessarily mentally).  Hence the preference is for clerics in the Latin Church is to be both 'chaste' and 'continent.'

Again, what I've just described is the contemporary understanding.

St Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, defined 'continence' somewhat more expansively than we do today; not that the contemporary one is wrong, it's only one half of a twofold definition.  In his Super Galatas, he compares "chastity" and "continence" in Gal 5:22 thus--

...as to the interior appetite, and concernint this he says continency, which abstains even from things that are lawful; and chastity, which correctly uses what is lawful, as a Gloss says.

Or, another way:  continence refers tot he fact that although a man be assailed by base desires, yet by the vigor of his reason he holds fast lest he be carried away.  According to this the word 'continence' is taken from a person's holding fast under attack.  But chastity is taken from the fact that one is neither attacked nor carried away, and is derived from 'chastening.'  For we call him well-chastened who is rightly tempered in all things [C.5, L.6, #334, underlined emphasis added].

One sees both the 'standard' definition of 'continence' in the first paragraph, but in the second paragraph, we have a second definition, which is a kind of fortification to chastity.  Moreover, today  one tends to speak of chastity and continence being 'side-by-side,' as it were.

Not so in Aquinas' second definition; in fact, 'chastity' and 'continence' in the second sense are more complementary than side-by-side.

In the Summa theologiae, the Angelic Doctor explains that the virtue of chastity is a subjective part of temperance (2a 2ae, q. 143, art. 1, resp.) and continence has something of a virtue but is more properly a potential part of temperance (q. 155, art. 1, resp.).  To make a long story short, the role of continence is to safeguard chastity, as a mopping-up operation is to a military victory (as Fr Walter Farrell OP STM puts it), since chastity resides in the concupiscible part in the sensitive soul, whereas continence resides in the voluntary part of the rational soul.  Instead of chastity and continence being side-by-side, Aquinas sees continence in the will governed by reason as buttressing chastity in the virtue of temperance.

As we saw earlier from his Super Galatas, "continence" has not only to do with abstaining from lawful desires (which, in the case of most Latin Rite clergy, means marriage and its conjugal joys), but also holding fast to one's chastity (think "custody of the eyes" in the older handbooks of the spiriutal life).

There's an additional rub, though.  Galatians 5:22-23 speaks of the 'fruit(s) of the Holy Spirit,' which Aquinas understands to be at the uttermost of the well-ordered soul:  a rightly-ordered habit, exercised in virtute, elevated by the Septenary, acting out the Beatitudes, to give something pleasing:  "Now the works of the Spirit are called fruits, not as something earned or acquired, but as produced...

...So, then, the works of the virtues and of the Spirit are something last in us.  For the Holy Spirit is in us through grace, though which we acquire the habit of the virtues; these in turn make us capable of working according to virtue.

Furthermore, they are delightful and even fruitful:  you have your fruit unto sanctification (Rom 6:22); i.e., in holy works.  And that is why they are called fruits.

...It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that the works of the virtues are called fruits of the Spirit, both because they have a sweetness and delight in themselves and because they are the last and congrouous products of the gifts [et quia quoddam ultimum productam secundum convenientiam donorum]  [C.5, L.6, #328].

 Thus, there is nothing about the Fruit(s) of the Holy Spirit that exclude them from being also virtues, because, as Aquinas explains, "In a virtue can be considered the habit and the act"; and, "as to the act of a virtue, it is either perfective, and in this way is a beatitude; ir it is a source of delight, and in this way is a fruit" (#329).  Here, it becomes somewhat difficult to 'untangle' the sequence of virtue, then Gift of the Holy Spirit, then acts of the Beatitudes, then Fruit(s) of the Holy Spirit from the kind of 'concomitance' between these sequential steps.  In S.th., 1a 2ae, q. 70, art. 1, sed contra, Aquinas says that "human acts are called fruits," but is careful again to explain that the Fruits are "only that which is last and gives pleasure" (resp.).  It looks as though we're going in a circle.

When Aquinas speaks of the Fruits being "the last and congruous products fo the gifts," his use of convenientiam points to a kind of "harmony," "agreement," or "consistency" between these Fruits and the Gifts.  Could it be, then, that at least some of the "parts" of a virtue are activated when grace is added to the soul?  If "chastity" and "continence" are listed in Gal 5:23--and Aquinas points this out in S.th., 2a 2a, q. 155, art. 1, resp.--we must ask:  Is there something to subjective and potential parts of of a virtue that owes to the Septenary being superadded to them?  At least in the case of chastity and continence, this seems likely.

Back in 2a2ae, q. 48, Aquinas introduces the idea of the three parts of a virtue:  "I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, integral, as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; subjective, as ox and lion are parts of animal; and potential, as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul."  Later, in q. 143, he appears to indicte that these parts apply only to the cardinal virtues.

Tentatively, I think we can say that, for at least some of the different "parts" of a cardinal virtue, some of these represent those things which are lacking in them is removed by the Seven Gifts.  In his Super Isaiam, Aquinas explains that the Septenary aims to remove a "twofold defect," on the part of the person's disposition, and the other on the part of what is lacking in a given virtue (C.11, L.2, #361).  In order to find a solution to our question, we would then have to locate each of the twelve "fruits" listed in Gal 5:22-23 across the Secunda secundae and identify which part of what assigned virtue they are annexed to.  In this way, we will see what parts of certain virtues are had only by those possessed of sanctifying grace and, in turn, see how hugely important the Holy Spirit is in the moral life.

Now, Scaramelli, aren't you ashamed of yourself?

Humility, Humility, Humility

One often hears Christian spiritual directors speak of the three rules of the interior life, "Humility, humility, and humility!"  At first glace, it may warrant a chuckle, but after reading St Thomas Aquinas' treatment of St Benedict of Nursia's "Twelve Degrees," there's really a logic to this threefold rubric:  Not only Benedict's, but also St Anselm of Canterbury's and the Glossator's (cf. S.th., 2a 2ae, 1. 161, art. 6)--which make three.

The question asked by the Angelic Doctor is "Whether Twelve Degrees of Humility Are Fittingly Distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?"  Our purpose will be to enumerate these, along with Anselm's Seven Degrees and Ralph of Laon's--the Glossator of Matthew mentioned in Objection 3.   Each queue will be accompanied by St Thomas' own analysis of the virtue of humility.  At the end I throw in my own two cents on the basis of my doctoral research project.

St Benedict's Twelve Degrees (Respondeo)
"...regarding the root of humility..."
12.  to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded

"...they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one aim inordintely at one's own excellence.  And this is done in three ways...
...First, by not following one's own will..."
11.  not to delight in fulfilling one's own desires;
"...secondly, by regulating it according to one's superior judgment..."
10.  to subject oneself to a superior;
"...thirdly, by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come our way..."
  9.  to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and ocntrary cirumcstnaces;

"Certain things are also included referring to the estimate a man form sin acknowledging his own deficiency, and this is in three ways...
...First, by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings..."
  8.  to confess one's sin;
"...secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things..."
  7.   to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes;
"...thirdly, that in this respect one should ont put others before oneself..."
  6.  to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all;

"Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs...
"...One of these regards deeds, namely that in one's work one should not depart from the ordinary way..."
  5.   to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monsatery;
"...Two others have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak..."
  4.  to maintain silence until one is asked;
"...and that one be not immoderate in speech..."
  2.  to speak few and sensile words, and not to be loud of voice;

"The others have to do with outward gestures...
...for instance, restraining haughty looks"
  1.  ...humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one's very person, one's eyes fixed on the ground;
"...and in otwardly checking laugheter and other signs of senseless mirth..."
  3.  not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter.

St Anselm of Canterbury's Seven Degrees (Obj. 3; ad 3)
"All degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement...

...For the first degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency..."
  1.  to acknowledge oneself contemptible

"...but since it would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded by the secon degree..."
  2.  to grieve for this

"...The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one's own deficiency; namely, that not merely one simply asset one's failing, but that one convince another of it..."
  3.  to confess it
  4.  to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it

"...The other three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consists of words or deeds...

"...For as Gregory says, (Regist.  ii. 10, Ep. 36), there is nothing great in being humble towrds those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this:  but we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer, and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees..."
  5.  to bear patiently that this be said of us
  6.  to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt

"...or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree..."
  7.  to love being thus treated.
"...so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seven mentioned above.

Ralph of Laon, "The Glossator" (Obj. 4; ad 4)
"These degrees refer, not ot the thing itself, namely the nature of humility but to the degrees among men" [emphasis added].

  1.  The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient.

  2.  The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility.

  3.  The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness.

The principal difference between St Benedict's "Degrees" from that of St Anselm's and Ralph of Laon's is that whereas the 'Father of Western Monasticism' and the 'Father of Scholasticism' outline degrees of intensity in the virtue of humility, the Glossator (and St Augustine in Obj. 5) outline degrees of rank among men and women who aim for humility.  Yet "the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regardin the root of humility, namely, the twelfth degree, that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind" (Resp.).  This squares nicely with the fact that the Gift of Fear from among the Septenary which likewise forms the foundation of the other six Gifts of the Holy Spirit.  This means, then, that by saying "Man arrives at humility...[f]irst and chiefly by a gift of grace" (ad 2); 'grace' is necessarily appropriated to the Holy Spirit (S.th., 1a 2ae, q. 43, art. 3, sed contra and respondeo), and this same Holy Spirit is never present in souls without his Seven Gifts (S.th., 1a 2ae, q. 68, art. 3, sed contra).

By way of an addendum, those wanting a serious, yet entertaining look at humility according to St Benedict need look no further than J. Augustine Wetta OSB, Humility Rules:  Saint Benedict's 12-Step Program to Genuine Self-Esteem (San Francisco:  Ignatius Press, 2017).

The REAL Magic of Harry Potter

'Magnanimity' exemplified...

There's a wonderful scene in Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone where the budding wizard is at Ollivander's to buy his first wand.  There, the proprietor, Mr Garrick Ollivander said to him, "The wand chooses the wizard, remember...  I think we must expect great things from you, Mr Potter."

And, of course, the greatness of Harry Potter was not so much his magical prowess (leave that to Hermione), but his character in how he uses this skill.  One might even say that it was Harry's virtue that made him the hero of the series.  As Albus Dumbledore said in the last installment, "Words are, in my not-so-humble opinion, our most inexhaustible source of magic."  Harry's "unfailingly kind" words--as Professor Dumbledore described it--evidenced the young character's virtue.

Thus, I submit to you, the real lesson of the Harry Potter series is the virtue of Magnanimity--or, in colloquial English, "greatness of soul."  We see this, for example, in his refusal to let Draco Malfoy fall into the flames in the Room of Requirement during the Battle of Hogwarts, or, towards the end, Harry's voluntary self-sacrifice to Voldemort in the Forbidden Forest in order to save his friends.  When I made my rounds to the Catholic schools, my preferred topic for conversation was "The Virtues," and often used the protagonist in R. K. Rowling's series to illustrate just this.

St Thomas Aquinas, in "baptising" Aristotle, retrieved the virtue of magnanimity, which "is about honour and dishonour" (S.th., 2a 2ae, q. 129, art. 1, sed contra).  In the subsequent respondeo, Thomas explains that "Magnanimity by its very name [from the Latin adj. magnus, -a, -um + n. anima] denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things.  ...And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly form its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great acts."  He then finds Biblical warrant for this from 2 Maccabees 15:18, "Nevertheless Nicanor, hearing of the valor of Judas and his men and their courage [animi magnitudinem, Vulg.; ἀνδραγαθίαν, LXX] in battle for their country, shrank from deciding the issue by bloodshed."  Here, Aquinas sees beyond the magnanimity/μεγαλοψυχία cognate to the sense of the word itself:  Behind the Latin phrase for 'greatness of soul' stands the Doric Greek word for 'bravery, manly virtue,' but also with the contextual sense of selflessness on behalf of the Jewish nation and the high cause of liberty from pagan oppressors.

This, in turn, suggests a common good for which the magnanimous person spends himself or herself--something very much inimical to the individualism now in vogue (I leave it to Millennials to account for the Orwellian double-think that is both de facto "individualism" and de iure "globalism").  Judas Maccabeus and his companions selflessly gave themselves up not only for the liberty of the Jewish peoples but also as a declaration of their faith.  Harry Potter gave himself up for the common good of saving his friends at Hogwarts and, by extension, the world (wherein Voldemort wanted to subjugate or even exterminate the "Muggle" population).  And, of course, the Theandric Person--the Magnanimous One par excellence--suffered usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis-- for the commonest good of all, namely the entire human race.  The opposite of this is pusillanimity, 'smallness of soul'--so as to be uncorageous, self-centered, and individualistic.

If one is not convinced that pusillanimity is such a vice, simply consider its current symbol--fighting over toilet paper.

...and 'pusillanimity.'

Torah + Christ = Equity

Leaving aside entirely the question of doctrinal "Supercessionism," there is something to be said about Christ's--and, later, Paul's--attitude towards the Moasic Law that exemplifies justice's allied virtue, namely equity.  Let's look at two Biblical texts.

The first is Mark 2:27, "And [Jesus] said to them, 'The sabbath was made for man, not man for the sabbath, so the Son of Man is lord even of the sabbath,'" whereby the Lord explains that the Sabbath mitzvot does not exist for its own sake but for the benefit of people and animals, to given them respite from labour (cf Deut 5:12-14).  Contextually, the Apostles were collecting grains to snack on one Sabbath as they there taking a leisurely walk--obviously no matter of labour or breadwinning.  The point of the Sabbath mitzvot was not to satisfy a debt to the Law or to God, but to satisfy a human need for respite and recreation--which is why it was enshrined in the Torah.

What Jesus is doing here is applying the virtue of equity to an Old Testament commandment, that is to say, to retrieve the intention of the Lawgiver which would otherwise be entirely set aside were the letter of the Law to be enforced in the case of the hungry Apostles.  Aquinas finds a clear-as-a-bell explanation of equity in the Code of Justinian:  "Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver" (cf S.th., 2a 2ae, q. 120, art. 1, ad 1).  Thus it was the Pharisees, for all of their meticulous observance of the Mosaic Law, who actually contravened it.  It is through the lens of equity that we ought to read, to take another example, the saying of Jesus, "What man of you, if he has one sheep and it falls into a pit on the sabbath, will nto lay hold of it and lift it out?"  Then, with no apologies to PETA, comes the sucker-punch:  "Of how much more value is a man than a sheep.  So it is lawful to do good on the sabbath" (Mt 11:1112).  Here, again, Jesus points out that the intention of the Lawgiver--YHWH--is never to demand man's observance of the Torah to his own detriment.  The Mosaic Law exists for the good of the human person.

(Perhaps this might be seen as the 'Copernican Revolution' in religion--religious observances were established not to placate a deity but to uphold human dignity.)

The second Biblical text is Acts 15:19-21, where the "apostles and presbyters" convened at Jerusalem to decide upon the first dogmatic quaeritur:  Are the newly-Christianised Gentiles beholden to the Mosaic Law?  James 'the Just' gave the following verdict, as it were:

Therefore my judgment is that we should not trouble those of the Gentiles who turn to God, but should write to them to abstain from the pollutions of idols and from unchastity and from what is trangled and from blood.  For from early generations Moses has had in every city those who preach him, for he is read every sabbath in the synagogues.

A number of exegetes recognise in this Apostolic decree a kind of re-issuance of the "Noachide Laws" which, according to Rabbincal Judaism, are the 'prime commandments' of the entire Torah, that is, every one of the 613 mitzvot can be traced to one or another of sevenfold Noachide Law.  Thus Verse 21, "For from early generations Moses has had in every city those who preach him...":  The general consensus among commentators is that these 'Noachide Laws' were already familiar to Jewish Christians, and so it would be redundant to reissue the prohibitions outside the circles of Gentile Christianity, again implying that the Noachide Laws were already inherent in the Mosaic Law.

Throughout the Torah, God commands that this or that observance is to be "for all generations" and the like.  Is it possible that the fact of Christians no longer observing the Kosher and purity laws, &c., owes to an equitable application of the Mosaic Law, which boils down to the ones enjoined upon Noah--and thus acutally perpetuating their observance?  If this is the case, I do wonder if it may be an interpretative key to the contemproary debate surrounding the "New Perspective on Paul" with respect to Christians' relationship with the Old Testament and to contextualise the conversation in a post-Shoah Europe.

"Love is God"?

Our readings last week for the 'Aquinas on Virtue' postgraduate seminar covered, in addition to the cardinal virtue of justice, the theological virtue of charity.  Charity, or 'love,' for Aquinas, is a very precise notion and one that is repeated by our contemporaries in a very imprecise way.  One such example, which I'd like to explore, is the Lutheran worship jingle God is Love, Love is God, sometimes heard in Catholic circles.

Here we'll sidestep the obvious English grammatical error that is switching the subject ("God") and the predicate ("love") and focus, instead, on how 'love' is understood by Aquinas, and to situate it within the famous Biblical passage "God is love" (1 Jn  4:8).

In the Thomistic framework, "love" is understood in four ways, which already renders the phrase "Love is God" ambiguous.

First, within the concupiscible appetite in the soul's sensitive power, there is the passion of love in S.th., 1a 2ae, q. 26, art. 2, sed contra, where it is described as an appetency for good.  This passion of love is threefold:  love for self, which aids in self-preservation; in sentient creatures, love is an appetite for sensory things which are desirable; among humans, there is also an appetite for what the intellect perceives as good.  In the last case, the passion is extended to the will, and it is here where Aquinas locates what has been the classical definition of love:  To will the good of another (S.th., 1a 2ae, q. 26, art. 4, respondeo).

The passion of love is part of that framework of romatic love.  More on that in a bit.

Second, there is the  theological virtue of charity which is defined, strictly, as a created supernatural habit in the soul's rational appetite (or the 'will') by which the Christian befriends God.  Aquinas explains--

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God (S.th., 2a 2ae, q. 23, art. 1).

Note that the passion of love is natural and that the virtue of love is supernatural.  What we often miss in English is that Aquinas assigns amor, amoris to the 'passion' of love but caritas, caritatis for the 'theological virtue' of love.  Both are created; the former is naturally-occuring and the latter is supernaturally-occuring.  It is for this reason that when reading 1 Corinthians 13 at wedding ceremonies, "love" must be understood in a precise way:  The passion of love is not spoken here, but the theological virtue thereof.  The legitimacy of reading this Pauline 'love chapter' is found in the ecclesial significance of Christian marriage and the sense of romantic love between Christian nuptials being 'elevated' to agape as per Benedict XVI's encyclical Deus caritas est (cf. n. 10).

Third, there is the hypostasis or the person of the Holy Spirit who is rightly named "Love" and "Gift."  In S.th., q. 37, art. 1, respondeo, Aquinas explains--

The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.

To see this we must know that since as shown above (Question [27], Articles [2],3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love.

Here, Aquinas appropriates St Augustine's 'verisimilitude' of the Trinity as Lover--Beloved--Loving, the Holy Spirit being the "loving" between the Father and the Son and the will within the Godhead, just as the Son is the intellect.

Fourth and finally, we have "love" under the rubric of 1 John 4:8, which Aquinas discusses at length in S.th., 1a, q. 20, art. 1.  The real problem, however, is whether "love" can be the essence of the Godhead; Aquinas, being in the tradition of Pseudo-Denys, uncompromisingly teaches the ineffability and unknowability of God's quiddity with absolutely one exception:  God's essence is his existence.  Since will is necessarily predicated of God, it inded follows that Deus caritas est, but by no means in the sense that love is the "stuff" or the res of Divine substance.

At the same time, "love" that is predicated of God is neither a passion (as in #1 above) because passions do not exist in God:  "He loves without passion" (S.th., 1a, q. 20, art. 1, ad 1; cf S.c.G., bk. I, ch. 89), since the passions are inherent in the human soul.  Nor is this "love" within God a theological virtue, because its particular modality is proper, again to the human soul which, again God does not have.  Nor can we reduce the triune Godhead to the Person of the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit as "love" and "God" as love differ as the immanent to the economic, respectively:  God always loved the Son, and that loving is the Holy Spirit; since God knows all things by knowing himself, he thus loves all things according to the modality of divine knowledge (cf. S.th., 1a, q. 14).  Thus, to treat "God" and "love" as a tautology on the basis of 1 John 4:8 would be to reduce the substance of God to his love for all things according to the mode of the Divine knowlege, in which case his "ordering" of love would be so different that there would no longer be a Trinity.

So, not only is the phraseology "Love is God" grammatically erroneous, it also mistakenly assumes that the copula est means we can tautologize "God" and "love" and overlooks that "love" is understood in several senses by Aquinas--to say nothing of the Greek "four loves."