Is Continence a Fruit or a Virtue?

When one reads St Thomas Aquinas, it quickly becomes apparent how the contemporary Church is occasionally removed from his thinking--the "Restorationist" party no less than the "Concilium."  Whether this is a good thing or not is beside the point; sometimes, (and I mean sometimes) "Thomism" falls victim to the game of Telephone in post-seventeenth century Manuals, particularly those prepared under Jesuit auspices (think of  Giovanni Battista Scaramelli and his divorcing of the virtues and gifts from moral theology in his Directorium Asceticum).

When the avergae pew-sitter thinks of the marital status of (most) Roman clergy, the phrase "clerical celibacy" comes to mind; ecclesiastical discipline prefers to speak of "clerical continence" since it is possible to be celibate/unmarried and unchaste (I'm looking at you, Theodore) and it is possible to be married yet continent (Catherine and Eddie Dougherty received a dispensation to do just this when they married).  'Celibacy' has to do with an intentionally unmarried state (it is not the same as being 'single'); 'chastity' as to do with the lawful use of the sexual faculty (which varies between married and unmarried people, and again between men and women); 'continence,' on the other hand, in the contemporary understanding is total absention from the use of sexual faculty physically (but not necessarily mentally).  Hence the preference is for clerics in the Latin Church is to be both 'chaste' and 'continent.'

Again, what I've just described is the contemporary understanding.

St Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, defined 'continence' somewhat more expansively than we do today; not that the contemporary one is wrong, it's only one half of a twofold definition.  In his Super Galatas, he compares "chastity" and "continence" in Gal 5:22 thus--

...as to the interior appetite, and concernint this he says continency, which abstains even from things that are lawful; and chastity, which correctly uses what is lawful, as a Gloss says.

Or, another way:  continence refers tot he fact that although a man be assailed by base desires, yet by the vigor of his reason he holds fast lest he be carried away.  According to this the word 'continence' is taken from a person's holding fast under attack.  But chastity is taken from the fact that one is neither attacked nor carried away, and is derived from 'chastening.'  For we call him well-chastened who is rightly tempered in all things [C.5, L.6, #334, underlined emphasis added].

One sees both the 'standard' definition of 'continence' in the first paragraph, but in the second paragraph, we have a second definition, which is a kind of fortification to chastity.  Moreover, today  one tends to speak of chastity and continence being 'side-by-side,' as it were.

Not so in Aquinas' second definition; in fact, 'chastity' and 'continence' in the second sense are more complementary than side-by-side.

In the Summa theologiae, the Angelic Doctor explains that the virtue of chastity is a subjective part of temperance (2a 2ae, q. 143, art. 1, resp.) and continence has something of a virtue but is more properly a potential part of temperance (q. 155, art. 1, resp.).  To make a long story short, the role of continence is to safeguard chastity, as a mopping-up operation is to a military victory (as Fr Walter Farrell OP STM puts it), since chastity resides in the concupiscible part in the sensitive soul, whereas continence resides in the voluntary part of the rational soul.  Instead of chastity and continence being side-by-side, Aquinas sees continence in the will governed by reason as buttressing chastity in the virtue of temperance.

As we saw earlier from his Super Galatas, "continence" has not only to do with abstaining from lawful desires (which, in the case of most Latin Rite clergy, means marriage and its conjugal joys), but also holding fast to one's chastity (think "custody of the eyes" in the older handbooks of the spiriutal life).

There's an additional rub, though.  Galatians 5:22-23 speaks of the 'fruit(s) of the Holy Spirit,' which Aquinas understands to be at the uttermost of the well-ordered soul:  a rightly-ordered habit, exercised in virtute, elevated by the Septenary, acting out the Beatitudes, to give something pleasing:  "Now the works of the Spirit are called fruits, not as something earned or acquired, but as produced...

...So, then, the works of the virtues and of the Spirit are something last in us.  For the Holy Spirit is in us through grace, though which we acquire the habit of the virtues; these in turn make us capable of working according to virtue.

Furthermore, they are delightful and even fruitful:  you have your fruit unto sanctification (Rom 6:22); i.e., in holy works.  And that is why they are called fruits.

...It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that the works of the virtues are called fruits of the Spirit, both because they have a sweetness and delight in themselves and because they are the last and congrouous products of the gifts [et quia quoddam ultimum productam secundum convenientiam donorum]  [C.5, L.6, #328].

 Thus, there is nothing about the Fruit(s) of the Holy Spirit that exclude them from being also virtues, because, as Aquinas explains, "In a virtue can be considered the habit and the act"; and, "as to the act of a virtue, it is either perfective, and in this way is a beatitude; ir it is a source of delight, and in this way is a fruit" (#329).  Here, it becomes somewhat difficult to 'untangle' the sequence of virtue, then Gift of the Holy Spirit, then acts of the Beatitudes, then Fruit(s) of the Holy Spirit from the kind of 'concomitance' between these sequential steps.  In S.th., 1a 2ae, q. 70, art. 1, sed contra, Aquinas says that "human acts are called fruits," but is careful again to explain that the Fruits are "only that which is last and gives pleasure" (resp.).  It looks as though we're going in a circle.

When Aquinas speaks of the Fruits being "the last and congruous products fo the gifts," his use of convenientiam points to a kind of "harmony," "agreement," or "consistency" between these Fruits and the Gifts.  Could it be, then, that at least some of the "parts" of a virtue are activated when grace is added to the soul?  If "chastity" and "continence" are listed in Gal 5:23--and Aquinas points this out in S.th., 2a 2a, q. 155, art. 1, resp.--we must ask:  Is there something to subjective and potential parts of of a virtue that owes to the Septenary being superadded to them?  At least in the case of chastity and continence, this seems likely.

Back in 2a2ae, q. 48, Aquinas introduces the idea of the three parts of a virtue:  "I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, integral, as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; subjective, as ox and lion are parts of animal; and potential, as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul."  Later, in q. 143, he appears to indicte that these parts apply only to the cardinal virtues.

Tentatively, I think we can say that, for at least some of the different "parts" of a cardinal virtue, some of these represent those things which are lacking in them is removed by the Seven Gifts.  In his Super Isaiam, Aquinas explains that the Septenary aims to remove a "twofold defect," on the part of the person's disposition, and the other on the part of what is lacking in a given virtue (C.11, L.2, #361).  In order to find a solution to our question, we would then have to locate each of the twelve "fruits" listed in Gal 5:22-23 across the Secunda secundae and identify which part of what assigned virtue they are annexed to.  In this way, we will see what parts of certain virtues are had only by those possessed of sanctifying grace and, in turn, see how hugely important the Holy Spirit is in the moral life.

Now, Scaramelli, aren't you ashamed of yourself?